In this paper we derive competitive search equilibrium when workers have private information regarding e¤ort and/or "type". Wage contracts are used to enhance e¢ ciency. We then investigate the e¤ects of economy-wide shocks on the unemployment-and vacancy rates.
Introduction
In this paper we derive the competitive search equilibrium when workers have private information regarding e¤ort and /or a match-speci…c "type". We then investigate how private information in ‡uences the responsiveness of wages and unemployment to aggregate shocks.
In any search market, the resource constraint implies that there exists a trade-o¤ between high wages and a high exit rate from unemployment. In competitive search equilibrium, a market maker optimally balances this trade-o¤. The resulting wage, or equivalently, employment rent (expected di¤erence in future income when employed and unemployed) ensures that the agents on both sides of the market have the correct incentives to enter the market and search for a trading partner.
In a pure contractual setting with asymmetric information, rents play a di¤erent role. In a standard principal-agent model, where the agent has private information about his type, this information makes him better o¤, he receives information rents. The stronger incentives the principal gives the agent to exert e¤ort, the higher will this information rent typically be. The principal thus faces a trade-o¤ between rent extraction and e¤ort provision, and chooses the wage contract so as to optimally balance these two considerations.
Our model combines the principal agent model and the competitive search model. When the market maker trades o¤ employment rents and a high exit rate from unemployment, he or she will take into account the fact that employment rent eases the constraints imposed by workers'private information and thereby enhances e¢ ciency. We derive a modi…ed Hosios rule determining the constrained e¢ cient allocation of resources. When the value of relaxing the private information constraints are large, employment rents are large while few resources are used to create new jobs.
Recent studies by Shimer (2004 Shimer ( , 2005a have demonstrated a series of empirical regularities of the business cycle that seem to …t poorly with the standard matching model of the labor market. He …nds that the ‡uctua-tions in the unemployment rate predicted by the model as a response to the observed productivity shocks are much smaller than the ‡uctuations in the unemployment rate that are actually observed. The reason is that wages are too ‡exible, and thereby absorb too much of the shock. He also …nds that a low job creation rate underlies the high unemployment rate during a the recession, not a high job destruction rate. Similar …ndings are reported in Hall (2005) .
A seemingly robust result for our model is that a negative productivity shock, which reduces the productivity of all matches with the same amount, tightens the constraints imposed by worker private information. It follows that employment rents become more important relative to creating new jobs, and as a result the wages become less responsive and unemployment more responsive such shocks than in the standard search model. We interpret such a shock as an increase in input prices (oil prices). If, in addition, worker e¤ort is more crucial after a negative shock (for instance because e¤ort and other inputs with higher prices are substitutes), this will further exacerbate the responsiveness of the unemployment rate. The same may be true if a negative shock is associated with (or caused by) more private information to workers.
On the other hand, private information may actually stabilize the unemployment rate for other kinds of macroeconomic shocks. After a negative shock to the matching technology, private information will dampen the responsiveness of the unemployment rate.
Two papers that are closely related to ours are Shimer (2004) and Shimer and Wright (2004) . Shimer (2004) suggests that private information may increase the volatility of the unemployment rate. Shimer and Wright (2004) construct a model where …rms (not workers) have private information about productivity and workers have private information about e¤ort. They study how private information may distort trade, and show that this increases the unemployment rate. They do not analyze how the allocation of rents between workers and …rms may in ‡uence these distortions.
Another related model is developed in Faig and Jerez (2004) . They analyze trade in the retail market when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for a product. They …nd that in competitive search equilibrium there are too many buyers relative to their full information bench-mark. However, they do not study the e¤ects of shocks. From a technical point of view, their model is similar to the model sketched in our "Example 2" below .
In Hall (2004 a and b) it is shown that the volatility of the unemployment rate will increase dramatically if wages are sticky. As a rationale for wage stickiness, Hall refers to social norms.
1 Wage stickiness implies that a larger share of the match surplus is allocated to the workers in a recession than in a boom. Our model gives a an alternative micro-foundation as to why this may be the case. Furthermore, in our model the countercyclicality of of the surplus allocated to the worker is an optimal response by the market maker in the presence of private information among workers.
Another related paper is Kennan (2004) , who also studies the e¤ect of information rents on unemployment ‡uctuations. In his model, workers and …rms bargain over wages once they meet. Firms have private information in booms but not in recessions, and thus earns information rents in booms. This increases the pro…ts in booms, and thus also unemployment volatility. Nagypal (2004) and Kraus and Lubik (2004) allow for on-the-job search in a matching model, and show how this may amplify the e¤ects of productivity shocks on the unemployment rate. Menzio (2004) shows that if …rms have private information, it may be in their interest to keep wages …xed if hit by high-frequency shocks. Again, this increases volatility.
Our model is also related to a large literature on e¢ ciency wage models (see for instance Weiss 1980 and Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) , and in particular to studies of how e¢ ciency wages in ‡uence unemployment volatility. Strand (1992) …nds that e¢ ciency wages reduce unemployment volatility. He assumes that …rms, after a negative aggregate shock, may be tempted to …re workers. As a result, …rms are reluctant to hire more workers during a boom as this will increase the wage necessary to deter shirking. Thus, if the productivity di¤erences are relatively small, employment does not change over the cycle. Dantine and Donaldson (1990) argue that e¢ ciency wages may exacerbate the e¤ect of productivity shocks on the unemployment rate if the shocks are short-lived compared with the time it takes to …re shirking workers. Ramey and Watson (1997) analyze how contractual fragility caused by a lacking ability of …rms to commit to a wage contract may increase the volatility of the unemployment rate. Rocheteau (2001) introduces shirking 1 In Hall 2005 it is shown that wage stickiness may be the result of alternative speci…-cations of the bargaining procedure or self-selection among workers. in a search model, and show that the non-shriking constraint forms a lower bound on wages paid to workers.
In this paper we …rst analyze the relationship between employment rents and unemployment within a reduced-form speci…cation of the link between rents and e¢ ciency. We also give two examples by using standard models of e¢ ciency wages. Then we set up a speci…ed model of optimal wage contracts taken from Moen and Rosen (2004) , and derive the relationship between employment rents and productivity from …rst principles. This allows us to study in more detail the relationship between private information and unemployment.
A general model
The model consists of two parts. The …rst part is the matching framework, which is the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework (Diamond 1982 , Mortensen 1986 , Pissarides 1985 . The second part links employment rents and worker productivity.
All agents are risk neutral and discount the future with the same discount factor r. There exists a continuum of ex ante identical workers with measure normalized to one. Workers leave the market at an exogenous rate s. New workers enter the market as unemployed at the same rate. The unemployment rate is denoted by u.
There exists a continuum of …rms in the economy. A …rm is either matched with a worker and producing or unmatched an searching for a worker. The ‡ow cost associated with search is denoted by c. The number (measure) of searching …rms is denoted by v.
The number of contacts in the economy is determined by a concave, constant return to scale matching function x(u; v). Let p denote contact rate for workers and q the contact rate of …rms. Since the matching function is constant return to scale it follows that we can write q = q(p), with q 0 (p) < 0. The surplus generated by a contact may be stochastic, and only contacts that generates a positive surplus leads to a match (i.e., an employment relationship). Let e H denote the probability that a contact leads to employment ( e H will be endogenized later on). The expected discounted income (utility) of an unemployed worker is given by
where z is income (utility) ‡ow when unemployed, e H , and W the expected discounted value of employment. The expected rent associated with a contact can thus be written as R e H(W U ). Let y i be the net output of a given worker-…rm pair. The expected income for this match is given by y i =(r + s): The expected income generated by a contact is written as Y . If y e = y denotes the expected productivity of a contact given that the contact leads to a match, it follows that we can write Y = e Hy e =(r + s). Let V and J denote the expected value of a …rm with a vacancy and a …rm that gets in contact with a worker, respectively. It follows that we can write
By de…nition we have that
Finally, let S denote the expected surplus of a contact, de…ned as
A key feature in our paper is that Y may depend positively on R; Y Y (R). There may be several reasons for this relationship:
Asymmetric information and moral hazard. As will be clear below, incentivizing workers in the presence of asymmetric information and moral hazard may require that workers receive rents.
More conventional e¢ ciency wage arguments. Workers may have to receive rents when employed in order to exert unobservable e¤ort (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) . Alternatively, workers may have private information about non-pecuniary aspects of a given job (similar to Weiss 1980) . As Y depends on R, so does the contact surplus S, we write S = S(R; U ). Note that
In what follows we assume that S R > 0 for R < R and S R (R) = 0 for R R . 2 We write S (U ) = S (R ; U ), and refer to S as the …rst best production level. In any search model the search frictions imply that R > 0. Thus, rents only a¤ect output if R is greater than the rents that prevail in search equilibrium.
Finally, note that if e H is independent of U on an interval (for instance because all workers are hired and e H = 1), then S RU = 0. Thus, the marginal value of worker rent in this case is independent of U . 
First best competitive search equilibrium
Our equilibrium solution concept is the competitive search equilibrium. In competitive search equilibrium, the expected utility of unemployed workers are maximized given the resource constraint of the economy (essentially the free entry condition of …rms). With asymmetric information, additional constraints must be added, namely the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality constraint of the worker. These constraints will be speci…ed later on. Now we just assume that any such constraints bind also for the market maker.
As in Mortensen and Wright (2002) , the equilibrium can be interpreted as follows: A market maker determines the wage contract in his market. Free entry of market makers then ensures that the only market makers that survive in the market are the one that maximizes the utility of unemployed workers given the free entry condition on …rms.
As a benchmark, suppose there are no information problems, and that S = S . The competitive search equilibrium p c ; R c ; U c solves
, where the expectation is taken conditional on Y being greater than U . If e H is constant it follows that S R = e HEY 0 (R), independently of U .
Our …rst lemma, below, states that if the information rent R is less than the "search rent" R c determined in the full-information equilibrium, the market maker can (and will) implement …rst best even in the presence of private information. Thus, in this case asymmetric information plays no role.
Lemma 1 Suppose the search rent R c exceeds the information rent R . Then the market maker can implement …rst best.
Proof: Omitted
If R exceeds R c , …rst best can still be obtained if the market maker can use cross subsidization, by collecting an entry fee from workers and a subsidy for vacancies.
Proposition 2 (Irrelevance of private information) Suppose the market maker can collect an entry fee from the workers, and subsidize vacancies that enter their market. Then the …rst best competitive search equilibrium is always feasible.
Proof: We know that e¢ ciency can be obtained if R c > R . Suppose therefore that R c < R . Then …rst best can be obtained as follows. When the worker and the …rm meets, the worker receives an expected rent R so that …rst best production is ensured. To obtain the optimal vacancy rate, the market maker gives the vacancies a subsidy D = q(p c )(R R c ) when entering the search market, so that the expected value of entering is
It follows that the correct number of …rms enter the market. The unemployed workers are charged a fee fee T = p c (R R c ) when entering. Since qv = x = pu, this scheme balances the budget. QED Cross subsidization between workers and …rms breaks the link between the workers'rent when employed and the …rms'incentives to enter the market. Thus, the market maker can solve for the optimal trade-o¤ between wages and job …nding rate without in ‡uencing worker productivity once hired.
A sign-on fee paid by the worker to the …rm may play the same role as an entry fee. If the worker has private information the sign-on fee must be agreed upon before the private information is revealed to the worker.
Constrained competitive search equilibrium
In what follows we do not allow for cross-subsidization between workers and …rms. As the market maker has to obey the individual rationality constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint of workers, the market maker faces a relationship S(R; U ) between productivity and worker rents. The competitive search equilibrium then solves
For any given R, there exists a corresponding value of p and U , hence we can write p = p(R) and U = U (R). By de…nition, U 0 (R) = 0 in optimum. From equation (3) it follows that
where el R p denotes the elasticity of p with respect to R. Let
Substituting in for el R p = 1 gives
where = jel e q( )j, the absolute value of the elasticity of q with respect to = v=u. 4 The equilibrium in the search market is thus given by 4 To see that that this is true, let p = e p( ). Then
When = 0, the equation is identical to the Hosios condition for e¢ ciency in search models (Hosios 1990 ). We will refer to this equation as the modi…ed Hosios condition.
Proposition 3 The constrained competitive search equilibrium obeys the modi…ed Hosios condition (7).
The modi…ed Hosios condition states that as the marginal value of worker rents increases, the share of the match surplus that is allocated to the worker increases. Thus, fewer resources will be devoted to maintaining vacancies.
In order to simplify the exposition we will assume that the matching function is Cobb Douglas so that is constant. We thus assume that x(u; v) = Au v 1 , in which case = . Let = 1 . It then follows that the modi…ed Hosios condition can be written as
Comparative statics
As mentioned in the introduction, an important issue is whether private information may in ‡uence the responsiveness of wages to economy-wide shocks. We do this by analyzing how a change in parameter values (for instance productivity) will change the unemployment rate. We assume that S RR < 0. Thus, the smaller is the worker rent, the larger is the marginal value of this rent. In addition we assume that e H is constant so that S RU = 0. We say that private information stabilize the unemployment rate whenever a negative shock (in, say, productivity) leads to a reduction in and thus to a larger fraction of the match surplus being devoted to job creation. In the opposite case, the incentive contracts destabilize the unemployment rate.
In general, a shock may in ‡uence the relationship between Y and R, and this will be analyzed in detail in later sections. However, some shocks will typically not in ‡uence this relationship:
Changes in the value of leisure (or unemployment bene…t)
Shocks to the matching function Contract-independent changes in productivity levels, e.g., input prices.
We …rst investigate the e¤ect of an increase in the value of leisure. (Formal proofs are given after the proposition below.) This will increase the unemployment rate in competitive search equilibrium. At the same time, an increase in z increases U , the prospects for unemployed workers. This will reduce the match surplus S (see equation 2), and for a given sharing rule this will reduce R. Since = S R and S RR < 0 it follows that increases. Thus, a smaller share of the surplus is allocated to job creation, and this increases the unemployment rate further. It follows that for shocks to the value of leisure, private information tends to destabilize the unemployment rate.
Let us then turn to shocks to the matching process. In competitive search equilibrium, a decrease in A or an increase in c increase the unemployment rate. A negative shock will decrease U , and thereby increase the match surplus S for a given . Thus, from equation (8) and the assumption that S RR < 0, falls. For shocks to the matching technology, private information tends to stabilize the unemployment rate.
Finally, consider a contract-independent changes in productivity levels. Suppose the productivity of all contacts falls with . This will increase the unemployment rate in competitive search equilibrium. We want to show that for a given , this reduces the match surplus Lemma 4 For a given , a fall in productivity (an increase in ) as described above reduces the match surplus S.
Proof: From the envelope theorem, it follows that
It follows that the lemma can only be untrue if the partial derivative @Y @ is less in absolute value than the total derivative (including the e¤ect of changes in R). But this is only the case if R falls when productivity decreases, in which case the lemma by de…nition holds.
It follows from (8) that increases. Thus, a lower share of the surplus is allocated to creating jobs after a negative productivity shock.
Proposition 5 Consider a shock to the economy. Then the following holds a) Incentive contracts destabilize the unemployment rate after shocks to the value of leisure b) Incentive contracts stabilize the unemployment rate after shocks to the matching technology and to the cost of search c) Incentive contracts destabilize the unemployment rate after contractindependent changes in productivity shocks (the same for all worker "types")
Formal proof: We give a formal proof of a). The proof of b) and c) are similar and therefore not included. Since U is maximized in equilibrium, it follows that U is increasing in z. Suppose falls. Then, by de…nition, R increases, since = S R and S RR 0. From (1) it follows that J falls. But then (8) cannot be satis…ed, and we have derived a contradiction.
In addition, the probability e H that a contact leads to a match may vary over the cycle. If productivity drop tends to decrease the number of contacts that lead to a match, the direct e¤ect will be that the unemployment rate increases even further. However, as S RU in this case is di¤erent from 0, this may also in ‡uence .
Before we turn to our main model of private information with observable output, we will give two examples related to the e¢ ciency wage theory.
Example 1. The shirking model
In the shirking model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) , workers are identical, but both worker e¤ort and output is private information to the worker. E¤ort is either 0 or 1, and output is y if the worker exerts e¤ort and zero otherwise.
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The e¤ort cost of is . Let g denote the probability rate that a shirking worker is detected, in which case he is …red. The non-shirking condition is then given by gR That is, the cost of e¤ort should be less than the probability rate of being detected when shirking times the cost of loosing the job. Let R ns = =g denote the lowest rent that prevents the worker from shirking. De…ne the constrained competitive search equilibrium as the allocation that maximizes U given the non-shirking constraint. it follows that R = min[R c ; R ns ]. Suppose we are in a region where the non-shirking constraint binds. A fall in y then has no impact on R. Since the contact surplus S decreases, this requires that increases, a larger fraction of the match surplus is given out as employment rents. Thus, shirking destabilize the economy. 
Example 2. Non-pecuniary aspects of employment
Suppose workers obtain non-pecuniary gains from the employment relationship, and that these gains are private information to the workers and thus cannot be contracted upon. In all other respects the workers have symmetric information. The model is similar to the model of Faigh and Jerez (2004) .
To be more speci…c, suppose the utility ‡ow of a match for a worker who is paid a wage w is equal to w + , where can take a high value h or a low value l . We assume that is I.I.D. over all worker-…rm pairs. Worker productivity is the same for both types of workers, and equal to y. E¢ cient matching requires that a contact leads to a match whenever S( ) 0. Workers, by contrast, only accept jobs for which R( ) 0. Suppose that initially, R( l ) 0 in the unconstrained equilibrium. Thus, both types of workers accept the job and there are no information problems. In this case, = 0.
Consider a fall in y. For a given value of , this leads to a fall in R.. Thus, after the shock we may have that R( l ) < 0 < S( l ) if the same surplus-sharing rule is applied. Thus, in order to motivate workers to stay after a low realization of ; the market maker may increase the share of the surplus that is allocated to the workers so that workers accept all job o¤ers. This will increase and thus destabilize the unemployment rate.
Optimal incentive contracts
We now turn to our main model of worker private information. The contracting framework is taken from La¤ont and Tirole's (1993) model of op-timal regulation, and the application to a labor market setting is borrowed from Moen and Rosen (2004) . In La¤ont and Tirole's model , the principal trades of incentive provision to and rent extraction from the agent. The market maker in our model in addition takes into account that the division of rents between workers and …rms in ‡uence the unemployment rate.
The productivity of a worker in a …rm is given by a function y = f ("; e). The variable " re ‡ects a match-speci…c productivity term, and is I.I.D. over all worker-…rm matches.
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In the general exposition we assume that " is continuously distributed on some interval ["; "] with cumulative distribution function H. The variable e denotes worker e¤ort, also unobservable to the …rm.
To simplify the derivations we assume that y = y + " + e. Thus, there are no cross e¤ects between e¤ort and worker type. Adding a cross term "e will complicate the expressions but will not bring new insights. A worker's ‡ow utility is given by ! = w (e), where w denotes wages and (e) cost of e¤ort.
A wage contract w(y) speci…es a relationship between a worker's wage and observed output y. We assume that …rms are able to commit to wage contracts. As shown in Baron and Besanko (1984) , the optimal dynamic contract repeats the optimal static contract provided that the …rm can commit not to renegotiate. 8 We therefore solve for the optimal static contract. When a worker and a …rm meets, the worker …rst learns ". Then the worker determines whether to accept the contract or not. If the match is not accepted, the worker starts searching again, while the vacancy dissolves. It is important that the worker learns " before the contract is signed; this implies that the information rents to workers from knowing " cannot be extracted by a sign-on fee.
First best requires that e = e = arg max e (e) and that the cut-o¤ productivity " solves y + " + e (e) = U c . In order to exert e¤ort for all values of ", all workers that are hired must be residual claimants of their e¤ort. The lowest expected employment rent consistent with …rst best is thus given by
Note that " also may re ‡ect ideosyncraticies of the job in question. 8 For an instructive proof see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p. 299 ¤. In what follows we assume that R c < R . Thus, in the absence of cross subsidies the …rst-best completive search equilibrium is infeasible. We will …rst characterize some situations where this typically will be the case.
3.1 More on the requirement that R c < R
The …rst thing to note is that if not all workers are hired in the …rst best equilibrium, then R c < R :
Lemma 6 Suppose y + " + e (e ) < U c . Then the …rst best competitive search equilibrium is infeasible.
Proof: The proof is done by contradiction. Suppose the …rst best competitive search equilibrium did exist. In this equilibrium, let " denote the (optimal) cut-o¤ productivity, given by the equation y+" + e (e ) = U c . The marginal worker must be paid a wage equal to his productivity. Furthermore, as w 0 (y) = 1 for all other workers, …rst best implies zero pro…t to the …rm. Thus, no vacancies enter the market and no workers are employed. This is inconsistent with equilibrium.
It follows that as long as the distribution of " is non-degenerate, the …rst best competitive search equilibrium is infeasible, provided that the search frictions measured by the search costs c are su¢ ciently small: Corollary 7 The …rst best competitive search equilibrium is infeasible if the search costs c are su¢ ciently small (provided that the distribution of " is not degenerate).
Proof: In competitive search equilibrium, p ! 1 as c ! 0. As a result, the optimal cut-o¤ approaches ". From lemma 6 it then follows that the …rst best competitive search equilibrium is infeasible.
However, it may well be that R c < R even if all worker "types" are hired. Suppose " = kz, where z is a stochastic variable and k a scalar. Then the following holds Lemma 8 For any given combination of parameters and any distribution H of z with …nite support, there exists an interval k 2 (k; k) such that for any k" the following holds: 1) …rst best is not feasible, and 2) the cut-o¤ level is equal to ":
The proof utilizes properties of the optimal contract (not yet derived) and is therefore deferred to the appendix (we do not use this lemma when deriving the optimal contract).
Optimal contracts
The optimization problem facing the market maker is given by (3)-(4). From the constraint (4) it follows that, for a given value of R and U , the planner maximizes the expected surplus S of a contact. This opens up for the highest p given R.
A mechanism is a triple ("; e("); w(")) that obeys the workers'incentive compatible (IC) constraints (workers choose e¤ort so as to maximize utility) and the individual rationality (IR) constraints (workers only accept a contract if it gives an expected utility higher than continuing search). Let R(") denote the rent to a worker of "type" ". The incentive compatibility constraint can then be written as
This condition ensures that an agent does not have an incentive to pretend that he is of a lower type than he really is. The individual rationality constraint requires that R(" ) 0. When R > R c , this constraint binds. The expected match surplus of a contact can be written as
which is maximized subject to the IR constraint, the IC constraint, and the expected rents given to employed workers:
The associated Hamiltonian is given by
First order conditions for e(") can be written as
Furthermore,
Since " is free it follows that (") = 0. Thus, = (1 H(")). Inserted, this gives
Let us then turn to the optimal cut-o¤ value " . The optimal cut-o¤ value is obtained by setting H = 0:
If H(") < 0, it is optimal to hire all workers, and we set " = ". From the …rst order condition (13), we can observe the following:
1. No distortions at the top, = 0 (e(")).
2. If the constraint associated with R does not bind, then all types of agents are given full incentives.
3. For all types ", the incentive power of the contract is a decreasing function of :
4. As ! 1, no incentives are given and the e¤ort level is equal to zero.
Note that dS dR (r + s) = H= R = .
Lemma 9 The following holds: a) The shadow value of worker rents is decreasing in R (for given U ).
b) If " > ", an increase in U reduces the shadow value of worker rents. If " = ", is independent of U .
c) The cut-o¤ level " is increasing in for a given U .
Proof: a) Suppose not. Then it follows from (13) that e¤ort, and therefore rents, fall. However, it then follows that S falls, otherwise we are not in optimum initially. Thus we have a contradiction. b) and c) are proven in the appendix.
; result a) implies that S RR < 0. At …rst glance, result c) may seem surprising. An increase in tends to reduce e, which again reduces the cut-o¤. However, a reduction in e also reduces the value of hiring a person. Given the shadow cost of worker rents, the value of e(" ) is optimally set, and the envelope theorem thus applies.
Let (a; b) denote a linear contract of the form w = a + by. It is well known that the optimal non-linear contract can be represented by a menu (a( ); b( )) of linear contracts (see, e.g., La¤ont and Tirole 1993) . For any b, the worker chooses the e¤ort level such that 0 (e) = b . Henceforth, we refer to b as the incentive power of the associated linear contract. Using the condition 0 (e) = b in equation (13), we obtain
Comparative statics
Earlier we referred to three kinds of shocks that may a¤ect the unemployment rate in our model: changes in the value of leisure (unemployment bene…ts), shocks related with the cost of matching (changes in A or in c), and shocks that are related to the production function. Let us …rst consider a shock to y. Suppose all workers are hired (" = "). Then S RU = 0. The …rst thing to note is that S RR < 0, therefore proposition 5 applies. In particular, private information destabilizes the unemployment rate after a negative shock to y.
Assume then that " > 0. The cuto¤ is given by
We …rst keep " …xed. A fall in y implies that the left-hand side falls (since y falls more than (r + s)U ), while an increase in implies that the right-hand side increases. Thus, " will increase. This will increase the unemployment rate even further. Note however, that as " increases this will reduce . Thus, we cannot say a priori whether total e¤ect on of a fall in y is negative.
Let us then turn to changes in the importance of e¤ort. We …rst rearrange our production function to
where e 0 > e , the optimal value of e. Note that this is equivalent with our initial formulation with e y = y + e 0 . Suppose that a negative shock is driven by an increase in (the importance that the worker exert e¤ort). If input prices drive the shock, this may be interpreted as worker e¤ort and other inputs being substitutes. In the appendix, we show the following:
Proposition 10 Suppose 00 =( 0 ) 2 is nonincreasing in e, and suppose " = ". Consider a positive shift in : For a given cut-o¤ level, such a shift will increase for a given S. In addition it reduces S, thus increasing further.
Note that the destabilizing e¤ects of contracts on the unemployment rate is stronger in this case, as it consists of two components. First, an increase in increases for a given value of S. This is not the case for changes in y. This comes in addition to the e¤ects through a reduction in R induced by the fall in productivity.
What about the cut-o¤ level. An increase in will tend to increase the cut-o¤ level. The same is true for a reduction in S (as for y). Furthermore, the increased value of b is higher for the low types than for the high type. On the other hand, low-type workers exert less e¤ort than high-productivity workers and will therefore cet par be less vulnerable to shocks. The net e¤ect is therefore uncertain.
We will now consider the e¤ects of an increase in the spread of ". Suppose " = kz, where z is a stochastic variable and k a scalar. To simplify the analysis we assume that " = ". An increase in k then reduces output, because the workers will be given weaker incentives.
An increase in k increases the amount of private information the workers posses, and for a given contract this increases worker rents. Thus, for a given R the incentive power of the contract is reduced. This tends to increase . On the other hand, an increase in k makes it more costly in terms of rents to incentivize workers, and this will tend to reduce the value of . If the private information problems are moderate, the …rst e¤ect dominates, and an increase in k increases .
Proposition 11 There exists a value e R < R such that an increase in k increases whenever R 2 [ e R; R ]
The proposition follows from the fact that at R , = 0, while for all R < R workers receive positive rents. From the analysis in Moen and Rosen (2004) it follows that for a given U , increases if and only if the average value of b is above 1=2 initially.
As for , an increase in k will have a double e¤ect on . First, it may increase for a given value of S. In addition, the productivity e¤ect lead to a reduced value of S (for a given ), which further increases .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed how private information among workers may in ‡uence the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to aggregate shocks within the context of a matching model. First we show that the equilibrium allocation obeys a simple, modi…ed Hosios rule. Then we show that private information stabilizes the unemployment rate when the economy is hit by shocks to the matching technology. On the other hand, if the economy is hit by productivity shocks that reduce the value of all matches, private information destabilizes the unemployment rate. This is also true if the economy is hit by shocks to the value of leisure.
We …rst want to show that an increase in U leads to a fall in if and only if it leads to an increase in " . This follows from the fact that for a given contract, an increase in " results in a lower value of R, as we are integrating over a shorter interval. Thus, the rent-constraint allows for more incentive-powered contracts. As a result, the shadow value of R (that is, ) falls. Second, for a given , a reduces the gain from hiring workers (reduces the left-hand side of 16), and by a revealed preference argument it follows that " increases (still for a given ). Put together, it follows decreases and " increases in U . c) To prove c) it is convenient to rewrite (16) as y + " (r + s)U = 1 H(" ) h(" ) 0 (e(")) ( e(" ) (e))
It is su¢ cient to show that the right-hand side is increasing in . Now the derivative of the right-hand side of the equation is given by 
Proof of proposition 10
Worker rent for any given type " 0 is given by
Suppose an increase in increases b(") for all " for a given . Then R must increase. Thus, for a given value of R, increases. Due to the envelope theorem, small changes in R does not in ‡uence U . Thus, in keeping R constant, it follows that p and hence J are constant as well. In order to satisfy (8) both R and must increase relative to their initial value.
It is thus su¢ cient to show that b(") is increasing for all " for a given . First note that e(") must be increasing, otherwise (13) In addition, an increase in reduces output, and as for a reduction in y this will reduce R for a given . This will further increase :
